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The Social Determinants of
Conspiratorial Ideation
Joseph DiGrazia1

Abstract
Scholars have recently become increasingly interested in understanding the prevalence and persistence of conspiratorial
beliefs among the public as recent research has shown such beliefs to be both widespread and to have deleterious
effects on the political process. This article seeks to develop a sociological understanding of the structural conditions
that are associated with conspiratorial belief. Using aggregate Google search data to measure public interest in two
popular political conspiracy theories, the findings indicate that social conditions associated with threat and insecurity,
including unemployment, changes in partisan control of government, and demographic changes, are associated with
increased conspiratorial ideation.
Keywords
conspiracy theories, political beliefs

Scholars have been interested in the relevance of conspiratorial beliefs to the political process for many decades.
Hofstadter (1964) provides, perhaps, the most definitive
description of what he called “the paranoid style”—the tendency to see grand conspiracies against one’s culture or way
of life as major motivating forces of history. Hofstadter
traces the paranoid style from anti-Masonic and anti-Catholic movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century
through the anti-communist paranoia that gripped the nation
in the mid–twentieth century. More recent research has
offered similar definitions, such as Oliver and Wood
(2014:952), who define conspiracy theories as “narratives
about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating political plots and social calamities to further their own nefarious
goals.” Uscinski and Parent (2014) add that conspiracy theories differ from conspiracies in that they are not endorsed by
epistemic authorities. This research has shown that conspiracy theories are still widely believed by the American public
across a broad variety of issues and that these beliefs are held
by Americans of all political ideologies and education levels
(Oliver and Wood 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014).
Additionally, other research has raised concerns that belief in
some conspiracy theories can have potentially deleterious
social and political consequences (Jolley and Douglas 2014;
Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2010) such as decreased political
efficacy and support for policies that are not supported by
expert communities.

While there has been a considerable amount of research
on belief in conspiracy theories and conspiratorial ideation,
the majority of it has focused on the individual psychology
and characteristics of those who believe in conspiracy theories as well as the social-psychological processes that account
for the diffusion of such theories through social networks.
While this work is important, it is also important to move
beyond individual explanations of conspiratorial ideation
and further develop an understanding of the social conditions
that underlie conspiratorial belief that focuses on macrolevel social conditions and structural change.
The analysis in this article attempts to advance the literature on conspiracy theories by using aggregate state-level
data on Google search patterns to examine interest in two
popular sets of conspiracy theories: those relating to the
“Illuminati” and those relating to the citizenship of President
Obama across U.S. states between the years 2007 and 2014.
Conspiracy theories focusing on the Illuminati are included
as these theories are employed by a diverse array of groups
and cover a wide range of topics not specific to any one ideological or partisan group. Conspiracy theories surrounding
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Obama’s citizenship, on the other hand, relate to a specific
politician and are highly partisan in nature. By studying both
highly generalized and highly specific conspiracy theories, a
fuller understanding of how and why people endorse conspiratorial belief systems can be developed.
Drawing on previous literature that has found that individuals tend to engage in conspiratorial ideation when
experiencing feelings of threat or insecurity, the analysis
looks at potential social sources of insecurity or threat in
the social and political environment that might motivate
conspiratorial belief, including partisan changes in control
of the presidency, immigration, and unemployment. The
findings indicate that social threat is associated with conspiratorial belief at the state level, but the sources of threat
vary between the two sets of theories with a very broad
array of threatening conditions being associated with
Illuminati conspiracy theories and partisan political threat
being the primary predictor of conspiracy theories surrounding President Obama’s citizenship.

Previous Literature
Much of the existing work on conspiracy theories focuses on
the individual and social-psychological determinants of conspiratorial belief. Many studies have pointed to the existence
of stable personality characteristics that make one more predisposed to seeing conspiracies behind political and social
processes. Oliver and Wood (2014) show that conspiratorial
beliefs are common among the American public and that
these beliefs are associated with a tendency to believe in the
power of unseen forces and Manichean narratives. The idea
that there exist particular personality traits associated with
conspiratorial belief is echoed by other scholars. Mirowsky
and Ross (1983) find that paranoia, or “the belief that people
are conspiring against you and deliberately trying to harm
you,” (p. 228) is driven in part by an external locus of control—a psychological tendency to see external forces as
being responsible for one’s successes or failures. Additionally,
Goertzel (1994) and Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, and
Furnham (2010) both find that individuals who believe in
one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others.
The implication is that these beliefs are motivated by some
latent psychological propensity toward conspiratorial ideation. Futhermore, Douglas and Sutton (2011) have even
found that those who are themselves more willing to participate in conspiracies are more likely to harbor conspiratorial
beliefs, projecting their own willingness to engage in such
behavior onto others. Finally, Miller, Saunders, and Farhart
(2016) find that individuals who are lacking in trust and
knowledgeable about politics are more likely to engage with
conspiratorial belief systems. They find that this is particularly true for conservatives in the United States.
Researchers have also argued that misinformation and
lack of information are associated with conspiratorial belief
(Kull et al. 2010; Nyhan 2010; Sunstein and Vermeule 2009;
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Warner and Neville-Shepard 2014). However, other work
seems to undermine the notion that information environments alone can be responsible for conspiratorial belief. For
example, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) have found that correcting false beliefs often reinforces rather than dispels these
beliefs among those who hold them most strongly. Thus,
while the conspiratorially minded may hold incorrect beliefs,
there are clearly processes driving conspiratorial ideation
besides simple lack of access to correct information.
While the existing work that has largely focused on stable
personality characteristics and information environments is
useful in understanding why some individuals might be more
likely than others to believe in conspiracy theories, it does
not explain variation in levels of conspiratorial ideation
across social environments and across time. There is another
line of individual-level research that provides some insight
into the potential social causes of conspiratorial beliefs.
Scholars in this line of research have looked at the role of
individuals’ perceptions and interpretations of their social
environment in fomenting conspiratorial belief. Sullivan,
Landau, and Rothschild (2010) argue that individuals who
perceive their environment to be risky or hazardous will
often project the myriad of complex hazards that exist in the
world onto a single individual or group to whom they attribute immense power and sinister motives. The authors argue
that this process allows individuals to maintain a sense of
personal control over their environment or at least the sense
of being able to understand the source of the threat. This tendency often leads to conspiratorial thinking. It follows from
this that in environments perceived as threatening, uncertain,
or hostile, conspiratorial belief should be more pronounced.
The notion that the experience of threat and uncertainty
may be associated with conspiratorial belief has been empirically supported by other research and has been connected to
the experience of threatening social conditions. Several
potentially important social sources of such threat and anxiety have been discussed in previous research, including economic stress, social change, and partisan polarization.
Goertzel (1994) finds that employment insecurity is positively correlated with conspiratorial ideation at the individual level. Similarly, Parsons et al. (1999) find that holding a
subjective impression that the economy is getting worse is
associated with higher rates of conspiratorial belief. However,
Uscinski and Parent (2014) call this into question, finding no
statistically significant effect for the unemployment rate,
increasing inequality (as measured by the national GINI
coefficient), or GDP on variation in conspiratorial ideation
(as measured by New York Times letters to the editor) in the
United States between 1890 and 2010.
Additionally, past research has pointed to social and
demographic change as an important social cause of conspiratorial belief. Hofstadter (1964), in his historical discussion
of paranoid and conspiratorial movements, finds that they
often focus on threats perceived to be associated with recent
immigrant groups. Additionally, research on other forms of
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defensive politics, such as reactionary and populist social
movements, has also found that the cultural threat posed by
growing minority or immigrant populations is a key driver of
support for such movements (Gusfield 1963; McVeigh
1999). However, more recent empirical findings supporting
the idea that there is a direct connection between demographic social change and conspiratorial belief have been
relatively rare. For example, while Uscinski and Parent
(2014) did find racial differences in conspiratorial predispositions, with non-whites being more conspiratorial, they
found no effect for their measures of social change on the
national rate of conspiratorial belief.
Research has also highlighted the role of partisanship and
the threat of being out of power as an important condition for
the development of conspiratorial beliefs (Uscinksi and
Parent 2014). This research has demonstrated that conspiracy theorizing tends to be most common among partisan
adherents and ideologues whose party is out of power and
that more conspiracy theories tend to be directed toward the
party currently in power. In the United States, control of the
presidency has been shown to be the most important source
of this partisan threat as it is the most visible and symbolically significant office in the U.S. government (Uscinski and
Parent 2014).
Uscinki and Parent (2014) propose a theory that attempts
to integrate the individual-level psychological findings with
broader political environment. The authors argue that while
innate disposition toward conspiratorial belief may be constant, different conspiracy theories will rise and fall in popularity according to changes in structural conditions. The
authors essentially argue that conspiratorial belief is a defensive mechanism used by weak groups against potential
threats. While the substance of specific theories may be false,
these theories serve to strengthen in-group solidarity and
increase vigilance against potential enemies. For this reason,
conspiratorial belief should increase among groups experiencing losses, increased threat, or feelings of vulnerability.
While Uscinski and Parent’s (2014) theoretical formulation represents a major step toward producing a social, as
opposed to psychological, theory of conspiratorial belief,
their ability to test their hypotheses is limited by the lack of
available data measuring conspiratorial belief at levels of
aggregation higher than that of the individual. This study will
remedy that situation using a novel data source—data on
Internet search volumes related to conspiracy theories—to
study variation in conspiratorial ideation across U.S. states
between the years 2007 and 2014. Using Internet search data
from Google Trends, a service that provides aggregate search
data from Google’s search engine, to measure conspiratorial
belief and interest provides a major advance over other data
sources, such as published letters to the editor or survey data,
in that it is possible to aggregate it to relatively high levels of
geographic granularity, it is available over time, and the data
consist of the directly reported interests of individuals in the
privacy of their own homes. It is not mediated by the editorial

Figure 1. Search frequency for Illuminati and Obama birth over
time.

policies of media outlets or by social desirability bias (for
a discussion of the attributes of Internet search data, see
DiGrazia 2015; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014).

This Study
Drawing on research that has found threat and insecurity to
be motivating factors behind individual-level conspiratorial
ideation, this research seeks to identify sources of threat in
the social environment that are tied to macro-level variation
in conspiratorial belief. Specifically, the social threats analyzed in this study include changes in partisan control of
government, unemployment, and immigration. While threats
relating to employment and partisan control of government
have been identified in previous work on conspiracy theories
as being associated with individual-level conspiratorial
belief, immigration has also been identified as an important
source of political threat in recent years by other researchers
(Skocpol and Willliamson 2012).
To test the effect of these sources of threat, a state-level
longitudinal analysis is conducted using data on Google
searches relating to two common sets of conspiracy theories:
those relating to the Illuminati, believed by adherents of
these theories to be a politically powerful and manipulative
secret society, and those relating to President Obama’s citizenship or the circumstances of his birth. Interest in these
conspiracy theories has fluctuated over time in recent years
and is shown plotted over time in Figure 1. Furthermore,
there is substantial geographic variability in interest in these
theories as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Map plots.

Conspiracy Theory Case Studies
The Illuminati
The Illuminati, a purported shadowy group that seeks to
advance its nefarious interests by intervening in global
affairs, is the subject of a wide variety of disparate conspiracy theories advanced by a large number of ideological
groups. The historical flexibility of this family of conspiracy
theories and the multiple meanings it has had for a broad
variety of social groups throughout history make it a unique
case for study. In many ways, it has served almost as a
generic template for conspiratorial belief systems onto
which nearly any fears or anxieties can be projected.
Modern conspiracy theories surrounding the Illuminati
trace their origin to the existence of a short-lived eighteenthcentury European secret society called the Bavarian
Illuminati (Barkun 2013; Hofstadter 1964). Although the
organization quickly folded under the scrutiny of European
monarchies and the Catholic Church, it lived on in rumor
and the imaginations of many citizens during the late
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, being accused of
involvement in a wide range of historical events (Barkun

2013; Hofstadter 1964). Throughout the twentieth century, the character of conspiracy theories focused on the
Illuminati changed and proliferated radically, focusing on
communism, religious stereotypes, and institutions of
global governance like the United Nations (Barkun 2013).
Finally, during the late twentieth century and twenty-first
century, strands of conspiracy theories about the Illuminati
involving UFOs, the administration of George H.W. Bush,
the entertainment industry, the September 11 attacks on
the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as the global
financial crisis became popular among various subgroups
(Barkun 2013; Yuhas 2015).
The remarkable flexibility, longevity, and generality of
conspiracy theories involving the Illuminati make it a
uniquely valuable case study. Unlike explicitly partisan conspiracy theories involving specific actors or political parties
(e.g., conspiracy theories about President Obama’s citizenship or the complicity of the Bush administration in the 9/11
attacks), Illuminati conspiracy theories can serve as a generic
template upon which virtually any conspiratorial anxieties
can be projected. For these reasons, examining geographic
variability in belief and interest in the conspiracy over time will
provide a more complete view of variation in conspiratorial

5

DiGrazia
ideation than any of the myriad of more specific conspiracy
theories that come and go in the public discourse.

Conspiracy Theories about President Obama’s
Birth Certificate
Beginning during Barack Obama’s first campaign for the
presidency in 2008, conspiracy theories began to emerge
about his citizenship and eligibility for the office (Howell
2012). These conspiracy theories, which came to be popularly known as “birther” conspiracy theories, came in several
varieties, the most common of which holds that Barack
Obama was actually secretly born in Kenya rather than the
United States. According to many adherents of this conspiracy theory, evidence purporting to show Obama to have been
born in Hawaii was fabricated by his parents shortly after his
birth or later by his campaign or others in anticipation of his
run for the presidency (Howell 2012). As such, they argue,
he does not meet the constitutional requirement that the president be a “natural born citizen.” This conspiracy theory
reached a high level of popularity among the public during
President Obama’s first term in office. For example, according to a July 2010 CNN Opinion Research poll, 27 percent of
all respondents and 41 percent of Republican respondents
indicated that they believed the President was “probably” or
“definitely” born in another country (CNN/Opinion Research
Corporation 2010). Even after the President released his socalled “long-form” birth certificate in 2011, 13 percent of the
public continued to believe that the president was probably
or definitely born in another country, according to Gallup
(Morales 2011).
Unlike Illuminati conspiracy theories, which are highly
general and flexible, birther theories are specific to the presidency of Barack Obama and, according to existing research,
are both highly partisan and highly racialized (Pasek et al.
2014). This research finds that adherents of birther conspiracy
theories are overwhelmingly conservative and Republican in
their partisan affiliations. Additionally, they find that birther
conspiracy theorists tend to be more likely to hold anti-black
attitudes than the general public.
Hypotheses. The following hypotheses can be derived from
the extant literature on conspiracy theories.
Hypothesis 1: State-level economic stress will be associated with greater interest in conspiratorial belief systems.
Hypothesis 2: Higher rates of international immigration
will correlate with increased interest in conspiracy
theories.
Hypothesis 3: The election of President Obama will result
in greater interest in conspiracy theories among political
conservatives and partisan Republicans. This should
result in a larger increase in conspiratorial ideation in conservative states compared to liberal states after Obama’s
election.

Hypothesis 4: There will be higher levels of interest in
explicitly partisan conspiracy theories in states that are
more hostile to the political party targeted by the conspiracy theory. In this case, more Republican states should
have higher levels of interest in the conspiracy theory surrounding President Obama’s citizenship.

Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this analysis consists of statelevel measurements based on aggregate Google search patterns associated with the search terms Illuminati and Obama
birth (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a fuller explanation
of this term). The data come from Google Trends, a service
that provides aggregate data on Google search patterns broken down by geographical areas and time periods. The data
used in this analysis are divided into four time periods covering 2007 through 2008, 2009 through 2010, 2011 through
2012, and 2013 through 2014. The data represent the relative
frequency with which users of the Google search engine
search for the terms Illuminati and Obama birth in each state.
The final time period is excluded for the Obama birth measure as the frequency of use for that term became too low to
produce viable estimates during that period.
Previous research has found that Internet search frequencies are a valid and reliable measure of public interest
in a topic (see Brownstein, Freifield, and Madoff 2009;
Carneiro and Mylonakis 2009; DiGrazia 2015; StephensDavidowitz 2014; Swearingen and Ripberger 2014; Vosen
and Schmidt 2011). The research design used in this analysis makes no assumption that all searches for the terms
Illuminati or Obama birth are performed by individuals
who believe in the conspiracy; it does assume that the overall search frequency for these terms is correlated with both
interest in each respective conspiracy and receptiveness to
believe in each conspiracy theory. Previous research has
found that while search data are not well suited toward estimating certain population parameters due to the unrepresentative nature of the sample, it is effective at measuring
public interest in topics and is thus well suited to measuring
public interest in conspiracy theories (DiGrazia 2015).
The data are arbitrarily normed as Google does not make
absolute search volumes accessible to the public. While the
norming is arbitrary, it has been adjusted to be consistent
both across states and over time, making values between
states and years directly comparable (for details on this
method, see DiGrazia 2015).

Independent Variables
Time Variant Variables. Unemployment rate is measured as
the average of the official unemployment rates for each state
over each two-year time period. These data are obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
T1: 2007–2008

Illuminati search volume
Obama birth search volume
Percent white
Population
Percent Obama
Immigration
Unemployment

T2: 2009–2010

T3: 2011–2012

T4: 2013–2014

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

11.35
68.07
81.74
5,617.05
50.48
2.10
4.82

1.99
64.00
11.89
6,185.59
9.45
1.26
1.09

26.94
67.87
81.74
5,617.05
50.48
2.096
8.61

7.27
71.46
11.89
6,185.59
9.448
1.26
1.97

70.876
80.28
81.736
5,617.05
50.484
2.10
7.73

18.771
78.14
11.891
6,185.59
9.448
1.26
1.83

67.275
N/A
81.736
5,617.05
50.484
2.10
6.06

13.685
N/A
11.891
6,185.59
9.448
1.26
1.34

Time Invariant Variables. The percent white variable is the
U.S. census 2009 estimate for the percentage of each
state’s population identifying as white. A time invariant
measure of this item is used as it is unlikely to change
radically over the timeframe of the study. The percent
Obama variable is taken from the Federal Election Commission and is the percentage of votes received by Barack
Obama in each state during the 2008 presidential election. This variable is intended to measure Democratic
partisan affiliation and political liberalism in the state.
The immigration variable is taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau and is a measure of the number of foreign immigrants received by each state between 2000 and 2009.
This item is intended to measure how much demographic
change as a result of immigration each state underwent
during the time period leading up to the study (see
Table 1 for descriptive statistics of variables).
Analysis. This study uses longitudinal regression analysis
employing generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to
predict state-level Google search traffic for the terms Illuminati and Obama birth with time periods nested in states. An
autoregressive disturbance term is used in the estimation to
account for autocorrelation.

Results
The results of the longitudinal regression analyses for
Illuminati conspiracy theories are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 shows a base model (Model 1) predicting statelevel conspiratorial ideation with state partisanship, immigration, unemployment, population, and percent white.
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship
between the share of the vote in 2008 captured by Barack
Obama and Illuminati–related conspiratorial ideation. Each
one unit increase in the percentage of the vote claimed by
Obama is associated with a decrease in Illuminati search
frequency equal to .422 (p < .001). Additionally, the statelevel unemployment rate is positively and significantly
associated with search frequency for terms related to the
Illuminati. Each one unit increase in the unemployment rate
is associated with a predicted increase in search frequency

Table 2. Regression Results for Independent Variables on
Conspiratorial Ideation.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Percent Obama

–.422***
–.642***
–.419***
(–4.51)
(–4.70)
(–4.50)
Immigration
.794
.783
1.565
(.93)
(.94)
(1.11)
Unemployment
2.458***
2.496***
2.221***
(4.74)
(4.88)
(4.21)
Percent white
–.356***
–.356***
–.355***
(–5.17)
(–5.29)
(–5.19)
Population
.000482**
.000482**
.000493**
(3.05)
(3.11)
(3.13)
Time 1
–53.13***
–74.41***
–49.05***
(–29.31)
(–8.02)
(–15.33)
Time 2
–46.96***
–61.84***
–41.19***
(–22.32)
(–6.87)
(–23.59)
Time 3
–.564
–9.052
–4.48
(–.34)
(–1.16)
(–1.69)
Percent Obama × Time 1
.422*
(2.34)
Percent Obama × Time 2
.293
(1.68)
Percent Obama × Time 3
.167
(1.10)
Immigration × Time 1
–2.087
(–1.59)
Immigration × Time 2
–2.462*
(–1.98)
Immigration × Time 3
2.059
(1.92)
Constant
98.72***
109.7***
98.30***
(11.97)
(11.46)
(11.75)
N
200
200
200

Note: t statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

equal to 2.458 (p < .001). The state-level immigration rate
does not have a significant effect on Illuminati-related
search volume. Finally, the results show that, consistent
with previous individual-level research, the percentage of
each state’s population that is white is significantly and
negatively associated with Google search rates for terms
relating to the Illuminati. Specifically, every 1 percent
increase in the percentage of the state’s population that is
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white is associated with a decrease in search frequency
equal to .356 (p < .001).
Model 2 includes the same predictors shown in Model 1
with the addition of interaction terms between the time
period dummies and state-level partisanship. The main
effects of all predictors are substantively similar to the effects
shown in Model 1; however, there is a positive and statistically significant effect shown for the Time 1 and democratic
vote interaction term equal to .422 (p < .05). This indicates
that the main effect of partisanship is severely reduced in
Time 1, the period before Barack Obama assumed office. In
other words, conservative states became much more conspiratorial than liberal states only after Obama assumed office.
This finding seems to support the notion that the perceived
threat of Obama’s election was a factor that motivated interest in the Illuminati conspiracy theory.
Model 3 includes the same predictors as the base model
with the addition of interaction terms between the time
period dummy variables and immigration. Here the main
effect of immigration (the effect for Time 4) is positive
though insignificant. The interaction effects for Times 1 and
2 are both negative, with only the interaction effect for Time
2 reaching statistical significance (p < .05) with a coefficient
of −2.46. The interaction effect for Time 3 is positive but narrowly falls short of statistical significance (p = .054). Taken
together, these results are suggestive of a pattern in which the
effect of immigration is stronger in later time periods than in
earlier time periods; however, this effect is not clearly statistically significant. A study with greater statistical power
might be able to more clearly discern such an effect.
Table 3 shows the results for the longitudinal regression
analysis predicting conspiratorial ideation relating to conspiracy theories surrounding President Obama’s citizenship.
Only one explanatory variable is consistently significant
across all three models: Obama’s vote share in the 2008 presidential election. There is a negative and significant effect for
Obama vote share across all three models, indicating that
states in which Obama received more support experienced
lower levels of interest in conspiracy theories surrounding
the president’s citizenship. The magnitude of this effect is
similar across all three models, with coefficients ranging
from –.425 to –.617. Additionally, there seem to be no significant interaction effects between time and Obama vote
share, indicating that the effect of partisanship or ideology
does not detectably change over the course of the time period
included in the analysis.

Conclusions
The findings of this study identify several sources of
social threat that are associated with increased levels of
conspiratorial ideation on the state level as measured by
Google search patterns. Specifically, with respect to conspiracy theories regarding the Illuminati, the findings
show that higher rates of unemployment are associated

Table 3. Regression Results for Independent Variables on
Conspiratorial Ideation.

Percent Obama
Immigration
Unemployment
Percent white
Population
Time 1
Time 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

–.617***
(–5.64)
–.0181
(–.02)
.52
(.88)
–.136
(–1.69)
–.00014
(–.76)
–2.896
(–1.14)
–13.56***
(–7.09)

–.425**
(–2.68)
–.00635
(–.01)
.471
(.79)
–.137
(–1.69)
–.00014
(–.74)
13.24
(1.28)
–.456
(–.05)
–.322
(–1.61)
–.259
(–1.32)

–.617***
(–5.60)
.535
(.40)
.459
(.75)
–.136
(–1.69)
–.00014
(–.73)
–1.207
(–.31)
–11.95**
(–3.26)

Percent Obama × Time 1
Percent Obama × Time 2
Immigration × Time 1
Immigration × Time 2
Constant
N

111.6***
(11.24)
150

102.3***
(8.94)
150

–.889
(–.57)
–.739
(–.50)
110.9***
(10.98)
150

Note: t statistics in parentheses.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.

with higher levels of conspiratorial ideation over the timeframe of the study. Additionally, the findings show an
effect for state-level political affiliation. However, this
effect is not constant over time and seems to indicate that
conservative states became more conspiratorial, even with
respect to non-explicitly partisan conspiracy theories,
than liberal states after President Obama assumed office.
This supports the hypothesis that partisans respond to
political threat with increased interest in conspiracy theories. The effect of immigration seems ambiguous, with
some evidence of a growing effect over time, though this
effect is not clearly established in the data at conventional
levels of statistical significance. There is also an effect for
race, with states with larger white populations searching
for Illuminati conspiracies at lower rates. Previous
research suggests two possible interpretations for this
finding: Non-whites may be searching for conspiracy theories at higher rates than whites or whites might be
responding to racial threat from larger non-white populations. While it is not possible to disaggregate these using
state-level data, the inconclusive results for immigration
do not suggest a strong effect for racial threat. Finally, a
much more limited set of predictors was identified for
conspiracy theories surrounding President Obama’s citizenship, with only partisanship having a significant effect.
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Taken together, the results of this analysis support the
hypothesis that macro-level social conditions and structural social changes can induce feelings of threat and insecurity that lead to higher levels of conspiratorial ideation.
These findings also demonstrate that some sets of conspiracy theories are much more flexible than others, having a much broader set of predictors. In this sense,
conspiracy theories like the Illuminati serve as genetic
templates for conspiratorial belief upon which any group
can project their anxieties or insecurities. As such, separate effects for partisanship, economic stress, and demographic change are identified in the model predicting
belief and interest in the Illuminati. Other conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding the citizenship of
President Obama, emerge as responses to specific events
by particular groups and do not seem to be influenced by
unrelated sources of threat.
This research builds on individual-level findings in prior
research that have found an association between threat and
conspiratorial belief and begins to forge an understanding of
the social conditions that can lead to increases or decreases
in the overall prevalence of conspiracy theories within society. Understanding the social origins of conspiratorial belief
is increasingly important given the widespread belief many
such theories enjoy among the public and the prominence of
many such conspiracy theories in our political discourse.
While many conspiracy theories are harmless, they can also
obfuscate important political events, decrease political participation, and drive support for misguided and potentially
dangerous policies.

Appendix
Table A1. The term Obama birth is used to measure interest in
conspiracy theories surrounding Obama’s birth and citizenship
as it has a high overall search volume and, based on the related
terms provided by Google Trends, seemed to be associated with
the broadest set of related conspiratorial terms. Related terms
are shown.
birth certificate
birth certificate obama
barack obama birth
barack obama
obama birth control
fake birth certificate
obama abortion
obama birth date
obama partial birth
obama birth kenya

100
100
20
20
5
5
5
5
5
5

Author’s Note
The data and code used to produce the analysis will be made available on my personal website upon publication.
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